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HEALTHCARE AND THE BALANCE-BILLING PROBLEM:
THE SOLUTION IS THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACTS AND
STRENGTHENING THE FREE MARKET FOR HEALTHCARE
GEORGE A. NATION III*
INTRODUCTION
COURTS across the country are beginning to understand that hospitalbills based on list or chargemaster prices are exorbitant and unfair,
because they reflect prices that are set to be discounted and not paid.1  As
* Professor of Law and Business, Lehigh University.
1. See, e.g., Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1137
(Cal. 2011) (citing Melone v. Sierra Ry., Co, 91 P. 522, 523 (Cal. 1907)) (explain-
ing medical expenses actually paid by or on behalf of patient, not billed charges
based on chargemaster rates, is proper measure of medical expenses); Greenfield
v. Manor Care, Inc., 705 So. 2d 926, 930–31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
healthcare agreement to have implied covenant to charge reasonable fee), receded
from by Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc. v. Knowles, 766 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000); Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (“A patient may not be bound by unreasonable charges in an agree-
ment to pay charges in accordance with ‘standard and current rates.’”); Victory
Mem’l Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (permitting jury
question as to whether charges presented by hospital were reasonable); Butler v.
Ind. Dep’t of Ins., 904 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ind. 2009) (explaining medical expenses
actually paid by or on behalf of patient, not billed charges based on chargemaster
rates, is proper measure of medical expenses); In re Adoption of N.J.A.C., 979 A.2d
770, 785 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (presuming regulation of physician fee
schedule was reasonable and valid); Kastick v. U-Haul Co., 292 A.D.2d 797, 798–99
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (agreeing with defendants that plaintiff could not recover
damages in amount she was never obligated to pay for medical services); Nassau
Anesthesia Assocs. P.C. v. Chin, 924 N.Y.S.2d 252, 255 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2011) (agree-
ing reasonable value of medical services is average amount that provider would
have accepted as full payment from third-party payers such as private insurers and
federal healthcare programs (citing Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt.
Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)));  Moorhead v. Crozer
Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 789 (Pa. 2001) (holding patient’s recovery for
medical expenses in malpractice suit was limited to amount paid and accepted for
services, rather than fair and reasonable market value of services), abrogated by
Northbrook Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 949 A.2d 333, 337 (Pa. 2008); Hosp.
Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)
(chargemaster rate “bears no relationship to the amount typically paid for those
services”); Doe v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 198–99 (Tenn. 2001)
(affirming lower court holding that patient was obligated to pay reasonable
charges for medical services and fair value of goods furnished); Haygood v. De
Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 397 (Tex. 2011) (explaining medical expenses actually
paid by or on behalf of patient, not billed charges based on chargemaster rates, is
proper measure of medical expenses); Daughters of Charity Health Servs. v. Linn-
staedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007) (finding chargemaster prices are not
value of medical services in context of hospital lien statute); cf. Holland v. Trinity
Health Care Corp., 791 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (finding
chargemaster rates are usual and customary).
(153)
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a result, courts are becoming aware of the fact that the list prices or
chargemaster rates that hospitals claim are usual and customary are in-
stead exorbitant amounts, arbitrarily set by hospitals, as a starting point for
negotiating huge discounts with insurers.2  Much attention has been fo-
cused by commentators on the ironic unfairness of the fact that uninsured
patients—that is, those least likely to be able to afford to pay for health-
care even at a reasonable price—are often expected to pay these exorbi-
tant rates in full.3  However, while this attention is certainly well-deserved,
focusing only on the uninsured misses the fact that it is not just the unin-
sured that are burdened by obscenely high chargemaster rates.
A large and growing group of insured patients is also being unfairly
burdened by hospitals’ exorbitant chargemaster prices.4  The burden is
brought to bear on these patients through a process known as balance
billing.5  When a patient’s insurance company has not negotiated a con-
2. See, e.g., Stanley v. Walker, 906 N.E. 2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2009) (“Thus, based
on the realities of health care finance, we are unconvinced that the reasonable
value of medical services is necessarily represented by either the amount actually
paid or the amount stated in the original medical bill.”); Cape Reg’l Med. Ctr. v.
Sanchez, No. CPM DC 109-11, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 26, 2012) (not-
ing that most patients, upon entering hospital, sign “Authorization for Treatment,”
“Statement of Financial Responsibility,” or another similarly open-ended agree-
ment pursuant to which patient purports to agree to pay for all medical goods and
services provided by hospital at hospital’s list (chargemaster) prices; in reality, how-
ever, this type of agreement amounts to blank check given by patients to hospitals
with amounts to be unilaterally filled in by hospitals later).  However, not all courts
have yet come to this realization, especially in balance-billing context. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306, 310–11 (Ind. 2012) (re-
jecting central premise of this Article that hospitals’ chargemaster rates should not
be used as basis for pricing on contracts for healthcare services).
3. See, e.g., Gerard F. Anderson, From ‘Soak the Rich’ to ‘Soak the Poor’: Recent
Trends in Hospital Pricing, 26 HEALTH AFF. 780 (2007) (stating hospitals often bill
uninsured patients full list charges); George A. Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The
Doctrine of Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101,
101–05 (2005) [hereinafter Nation, Obscene Contracts]; Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pric-
ing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 58
(2006) [hereinafter Reinhardt, U.S. Hospital Services] (explaining that self-payers
usually forced to accept full charges set by hospital); Christopher P. Tompkins,
Stuart H. Altman & Efrat Eilat, The Precarious Pricing System for Hospital Services, 25
HEALTH AFF. 45, 52 (2006) (same); Lucette Lagnado, Anatomy of a Hospital Bill,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2004, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109571706550822844
[https://perma.cc/9Q6V-FTZS]; cf. Glenn A. Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Hospital
Pricing and the Uninsured: Do the Uninsured Pay Higher Prices?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 116
(2008) (asserting that uninsured pay more than some but less than others).
4. See generally Melnick & Fonkych, supra note 3 (observing that insured indi-
viduals suffer from chargemaster rates).
5. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the
Flawed Theory of Cost Shifting: Is It Time for a More Rational All-Payer System?, 30
HEALTH AFF. 2125 (2011) (discussing high prices faced by insured patients who
receive care outside of their insurers network); Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical
Bills Are Killing Us, TIME, Mar. 4, 2013, available at http://www.claims.org/pdf/
time_article.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE7X-HWD7] (discussing outrageous bills im-
posed on insured patients who receive care from providers who are outside of pa-
tient’s insurance network); Caroline Chen, Surprise Medical Bills Lead to Protection
2
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tract with the hospital that provides services to the patient, the patient is
considered out of network—“OON,” in hospital speak—and as a result,
the discounts that the hospital has negotiated with other insurers do not
apply to the OON patient.6  The patient’s insurer pays the hospital the
amount that the insurance company is obligated to pay for the services
received, but this amount, being reasonable, is always far less than the un-
reasonably high list price set by the hospital.7  Because the OON patient’s
insurer has no contract with the hospital, the hospital is not obligated to
accept the payment from the insurance company as full payment, and
therefore the hospital is permitted to bill the patient for the balance that
is the difference between the obscenely high hospital list price and the
reasonable amount that the insurance company paid.  Moreover, for a va-
riety of reasons, hospital networks are becoming narrower as hospital sys-
tems contract with fewer insurers, and as a result, more and more patients
are receiving balance bills.8
In addition, not only do the price and collection limitations included
in the Affordable Care Act (ACA or Act)—Obamacare—not prevent bal-
ance billing, the Act allows for the sale of narrow network health insur-
ance, enshrines exorbitantly high chargemaster rates, and encourages
balance billing.9  Finally, the practice of balance billing puts upward pres-
sure on healthcare prices in general.10  That is, this practice leads to
Laws: Health, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti
cles/2014-04-04/surprise-medical-bills-lead-to-protection-laws-health [https://per
ma.cc/QTG5-5ZJU] (“It’s important to protect the consumer now [since the pas-
sage of the Affordable Care Act], because there’s a little more chaos in the system
and a lot more people, [and] balance-billing is the most-common payment prob-
lem seen at her nonprofit advocacy organization, which handled 65,000 health-
care cases last year.” (quoting Elisabeth Benjamin, Vice President of Health Initia-
tives, Cmty. Serv. Soc’y of N.Y.) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally
JACK HOADLEY, KEVIN LUCIA & SONYA SCHWARTZ, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., UNEX-
PECTED CHARGES: WHAT STATES ARE DOING ABOUT BALANCE BILLING (2009), availa-
ble at, http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/PDF%
20U/PDF%20UnexpectedChargesStatesAndBalanceBilling.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5Z7G-KG55].
6. See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 3–5.
7. See, e.g., George A. Nation III, Determining the Fair and Reasonable Value of
Medical Services: The Affordable Care Act, Government Insurers, Private Insurers and Unin-
sured Patients, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 425, 434–35 (2013) [hereinafter Nation, Determin-
ing Fair and Reasonable Value] (providing actual hospital pricing for hypothetical
gall bladder surgery that would have list price of $14,000; $5,600 price for HMOs;
price of $4,700 for Blue Cross/Blue Shield; price of $5,000 for Aetna; price of
$2,590 for Medicare; and $1,260 for Medicaid—for same exact services).
8. See, e.g., Reed Abelson, More Insured, but the Choices Are Narrowing, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/business/more-in
sured-but-the-choices-are-narrowing.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/F4BS-SH8A]
(noting that because many health insurance policies sold on Affordable Care Act
(ACA) exchanges use narrow networks, out-of-network care and balance-billing are
becoming more frequent).
9. See infra notes 24–83 and accompanying text.
10. See Ge Bai & Gerard F. Anderson, Extreme Markup: The Fifty US Hospitals
with the Highest Charge-to-Cost Ratios, 34 HEALTH AFF. 922, 925 (2015) (noting that
3
Nation: Healthcare and the Balance-Billing Problem: The Solution Is the C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
156 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 153
higher prices across the board for the uninsured, the out-of-network in-
sured, and even the in-network insured.11
I have written about the balance-billing problem in other work and
have suggested there the adoption of government regulations directed at
hospitals that would both address the balance-billing problem and im-
prove the functioning of the free market for healthcare by providing price
transparency.12  A few states have attempted to address this problem legis-
latively with mixed success.13  The focus of this Article is on the practice of
balance billing, what courts can do now under existing law to address this
problem, and the type of legislation that will provide a long-term solution
to the broader problem of market failure regarding the sale of healthcare.
This Article argues that more government price-fixing is not the solution.
The primary goal of healthcare policy in the United States should not be
to increase access and control the price of healthcare; rather, it should be
to develop the best healthcare in the world at the lowest price.14  The only
high markups [chargemaster rates] may add to private insurance premiums and
play role in rise of overall healthcare spending); Robert Murray, Hospital Charges
and the Need for a Maximum Price Obligation Rule for Emergency Department & Out-of-
Network Care, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 16, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/
2013/05/16/hospital-charges-and-the-need-for-a-maximum-price-obligation-rule-
for-emergency-department-out-of-network-care/ [https://perma.cc/JWC4-XDLE].
Murray states as follows:
Charges Do Matter—They Matter a Great Deal.
Counter to the belief of both hospital industry representatives and
many of my colleagues, hospital charge levels and rapidly escalating
charges matter a great deal.  While individual states and the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) have instituted limits on the amounts low-income unin-
sured patients pay hospitals, insured patients that receive care at hospitals
that are “Non-Par” or “out-of-network” are still victims of hospital’s exor-
bitant charging practices.  When patients receive emergency services at
an out-of-network hospital, the patient and/or insurance company (de-
pending on insurer cost sharing for out-of-network care) pay full charges.
High and increasing hospital charges, combined with increasing pro-
portions of cases admitted through the hospital Emergency Department
(ED), are major factors behind the ever-declining negotiating leverage of
private health insurers.  This situation, coupled with the increased pric-
ing power of the ever-more-concentrated provider industry, will be a ma-
jor contributor to the almost certain rapid escalation in total U.S. health
care costs in coming years.
Id.
11. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
12. See generally, George A. Nation III, Hospital Chargemaster Insanity: Heeling the
Healers, 43 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Nation, Chargemaster In-
sanity]; Nation, Determining Fair and Reasonable Value, supra note 7; Nation, Obscene
Contracts, supra note 3.
13. See, e.g., HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 6–9. (noting that nine states have
enacted legislation in attempt to deal with balance billing and problem of these
efforts have met with mixed results).
14. See George A. Nation III, Non-Profit Charitable Tax-Exempt Hospitals—Wolves
in Sheep’s Clothing: To Increase Fairness and Enhance Competition in Health Care All
Hospitals Should Be For-Profit and Taxable, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 141, 198–209 (2010)
[hereinafter Nation, Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing] (citation omitted within title) (argu-
4
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mechanism we have for doing that is the free market.15  While there is
additional government regulation that would be helpful in strengthening
the free market for healthcare,16 I argue here that we do not have to wait
for such regulation; the common law of contracts contains the tools neces-
sary to allow courts to provide a free market solution to the balance-billing
problem now.17
Part I provides background concerning the problem of balance bill-
ing.  Part II provides an analysis of the problem and suggests that part of
the solution to the lack of competition in the sale of healthcare (of which
the balance-billing problem is a symptom) requires, inter alia, government
regulation designed to require meaningful price disclosure by hospitals,
along with other steps to further strengthen the free market for healthcare
in the United States.  Part III discusses what courts can do now with the
tools currently available to them to solve the problem of balance billing in
a way consistent with a strong free-market for healthcare.  Part IV
concludes.
I. BACKGROUND: THE PROBLEM
In a recent newspaper article a journalist recounted the story of a
fifty-year-old construction worker who experienced chest pains and was ad-
mitted to St. Francis Hospital in Bartlett, Tennessee, in 2014.18  His wife
said they were not told either at the time of admission or during their visit
that the hospital did not accept their health insurance.19  The couple re-
ceived a bill from the hospital for $22,945.20  As the article points out,
under the ACA, a family’s out-of-pocket expenses (this would include
charges for things like co-pays, co-insurance, etc.) for 2014 were capped at
$12,700.21  However, this limitation under the ACA does not apply to non-
emergency room charges provided by an out-of-network hospital.22  That
is, the limitation does not protect patients from balance billing, and thus
the family received a bill for $22,945.  In this case, the family was lucky;
they appealed the charges, and the hospital eventually reduced their bill
ing that definition of word better—as in better healthcare—is key to policy
formulation).
15. See id. at 181–85 (arguing that non-profit, tax-exempt business model is
not appropriate for hospitals and that only free market competition can accom-
plish healthcare goals).
16. See infra notes 98–125 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 84–148 and accompanying text.
18. See Stephanie Armour, Surprise Bills for Many Under Health Law, WALL ST. J.,
June 11, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/surprise-bills-for-many-under-health-
law-1434042543 [https://perma.cc/Y6EP-2N9F].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
5
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to $600—but only after the bill had been sent to a collection agency,
which the family worries will hurt their credit rating.23
A. Narrow Networks
In 2015, under the ACA, out-of-pocket costs were capped at $6,600 for
an individual and $13,200 for a family.24  But again, these caps do not
apply to out-of-network providers who charge patients for the portion of
their bills that their insurance does not pay.25  Moreover, this balance-bill-
ing problem is getting worse because networks are becoming narrower.26
A network consists of the hospitals with which an insurer has con-
tracted.27  Pursuant to those contracts, hospitals agree to dramatically dis-
count their list prices.28  If a provider is not in-network, that means that
the insurance company has no contract with the hospital, and patients
who are insured by that company are not entitled to the huge discounts
and instead are, according to the hospital, responsible for the fully undis-
counted, obscenely high, list price for the services they receive.
A network is narrow if it only includes a few hospitals.29  A wide net-
work, which includes many hospitals, gives patients more choice as to
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. (noting that plans with narrow networks make up about half of all
health law exchange networks and about two-thirds of networks in large cities); see
also Abelson, supra note 8 (acknowledging balance-billing becoming more
frequent).
27. See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 3–5.
28. See Nation, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 12, at *19–23 (noting that self-
pay patients billed chargemaster rates are asked to pay are at least 2.5 times
amount paid by health insurers for same exact care); Nation, Determining Fair and
Reasonable Value, supra note 7, at 429–30.
Another important characteristic of healthcare is that chargemaster
or list prices are not fair or reasonable.  They are grossly inflated because
they are set to be discounted rather than paid.  Hospitals, in general, do
not expect to recover these inflated prices, but . . . they are very reluctant
to reduce them for self-pay patients.  Nevertheless, hospitals and other
providers maintain that the grossly inflated list prices contained in their
chargemasters are “reasonable and customary,” in part because every pa-
tient, insured or uninsured, receives a detailed itemized bill reflecting
chargemaster prices.  As a result, hospitals sometimes claim that all pa-
tients are billed at chargemaster rates.  However, while all patients are
billed chargemaster rates, all patients are not expected to pay the billed
charges. . . .  [F]or insured patients, the billed (chargemaster based)
amount is dramatically (at least 50%) discounted.  Thus, while hospitals
claim that the chargemaster rates reflect their usual and customary charge
for services, they certainly do not represent the usual price actually paid
for the listed goods and services.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
29. See Armour, supra note 18 (explaining health plans offered by employers
also have been reducing number of doctors and hospitals in their networks, but
what have come to be known as narrow networks are more prevalent in plans of-
fered on ACA exchanges).
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where to seek care.  A poll conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation
found that more than half of Americans believe that it is important to
make sure that health plans have sufficient networks to provide a wide
choice of doctors and hospitals.30  However, according to a 2015 report by
McKinsey & Company, plans with narrow networks make up half of all
insurance networks offered through the ACA, and narrow networks make
up about two-thirds of the insurance networks offered through the ACA in
the largest cities.31  As insurance networks become narrower, more pa-
tients are burdened with exorbitant hospital debt pursuant to balance
billing.32
The reason that networks are becoming narrower is the desire on the
part of hospital systems to increase profits.33  For example, in some cases,
insurance companies cannot afford the reimbursement levels being
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Murray, supra note 10.
More importantly, the already astronomical and rapidly escalating
hospital charge levels also have a less obvious impact on the rise in overall
health care costs.  High and increasing charges fundamentally under-
mine the negotiating leverage of private payers relative to hospitals, both
big and small.  This dynamic, which has been playing out in negotiations
between private insurers and hospitals for years, goes something like this:
. . . .
When hospitals negotiate with health plans they have one of two op-
tions: 1) they can take a lower negotiated rate (around 135 percent of
cost, which is the average payment level nationally as shown by the AHA
statistics) and receive higher volumes of patients by virtue of being “in-
network”; or 2) they can decline to be in-network and receive an average
profit of 220 percent of costs on smaller patient volumes admitted
through their EDs.  The higher the profit on ED patients that pay out-of-
network rates, the stronger the incentive for the hospital to drive hard
bargains with insurers over negotiated prices.
Recent analyses of private-sector pricing trends show stronger-than-
average growth in hospital prices for Emergency Department services.
The Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI), which monitors spending trends
by private insurers, found that from 2009 to 2011, unit prices for ED ser-
vices increased by 16.3 percent, compared to 9.9 percent and 8.1 percent
increases in prices for inpatient and ancillary services, respectively.  The
profit-making opportunity to raise prices for services with highly inelastic
demand curves is clearly not lost on the hospital industry.
. . . .
However, even under Scenario 1, with markups at 320 percent or
higher, the hospital has relatively little incentive to negotiate with a
health plan that cannot promise substantial volumes.  The bottom line
conclusion, then, is that high markups and heavy and growing use of the
ED as a source of admission act to substantially reduce insurer market
power, even for providers with relatively small market share.  Those who
negotiate on behalf [of] commercial insurers are well aware of how the
ability of hospitals to raise charges completely undermines their own ne-
gotiating leverage.
Id.
7
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demanded by hospital systems in order to become in-network.34  Some
hospital systems choose to purposely limit the size of their networks be-
cause they feel that this strengthens their financial bargaining position
and allows them to recoup higher payments from insurers and patients.35
An important cause of this is the increased concentration that has oc-
curred on the provider side of the market.36  As hospitals consolidate,
more large healthcare systems are created, and these dominant systems do
not feel any competitive pressure to contract with insurance companies at
reasonable reimbursement rates.37
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
It is a well-documented fact that provider consolidation—which research
shows leads to higher prices—is already extreme and once again on the
rise.
. . . .
As Barak Richman from the Duke School of Law has discussed,
health care providers with market power enjoy substantially more pricing
freedom than monopolists in other industries because of the presence of
U.S. style health insurance, which largely insulates consumers from the
full implications of monopoly pricing.  This dynamic results in much
greater potential for revenue generation and much greater distribution
of wealth than would result from monopoly power in markets where con-
sumers face the prices and price increases directly.
Thus, the prospects for cost control are greatly diminished as long as
providers are allowed to exercise their monopoly power, particularly
where they face a highly inelastic demand curve—namely for emergency
department services.  The ability to hold a gun to the head of private
insurers in this fashion is a by-product of provider consolidation, the en-
hanced pricing flexibility of health care monopolies, and the increasing
proportions of admissions through hospital EDs.
Id. (citations omitted).
37. See id.; Elisabeth Rosenthal, As Hospital Prices Soar, a Stitch Tops $500, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/03/health/as-hospital-
costs-soar-single-stitch-tops-500.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
VU7N-LWP9?type=image] (quoting Glenn Melnick, Professor of Health Econ.,
Univ. of S. Cal.) (regarding California Pacific Medical Center, which is owned by
Sutter Health Inc., whose chargemaster rates are 5.5 to more than 10 times the
Medicare reimbursement rate).
According to Professor Melnick, “Sutter is a leader—a pioneer—in figuring
out how to amass market power to raise prices and decrease competition.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Research shows that today’s hospital mergers
tend to drive up prices.  For example in the case of Sutter, it operates the only
hospital in some California cities.  As a result, employers have limited ability to
fight back against Sutter’s high fees.  Professor Melnick notes that hospitals set
prices to maximize revenue, and they raise prices as much as they can.  In addition,
Professor Melnick notes that chargemaster prices are basically arbitrary, not con-
nected to underlying cost or market prices; hospitals can set them at any level they
want.  There are no market constraints.  Hospitals are the most powerful players in
the healthcare system and there is little or no price regulation in the private mar-
ket. See MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., POLICY
BRIEF NO. 9, THE IMPACT OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION—UPDATE 2 (2012), available
at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf73261
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B. No Notice, No Control, and Unfair Surprise
Even patients who are aware of the risks of balance billing and who,
given their medical condition, are in a position to make a choice regard-
ing where to seek treatment, find it difficult, if not impossible, to prevent
balance billing.38  This is because it is often extremely difficult for a pa-
tient to determine whether the provider from whom they are seeking med-
ical services is in-network or out-of-network.39  Moreover, the mere fact
that a patient seeks medical services from an in-network hospital does not
ensure that the doctors treating the patient are also in-network.40  That is,
it is very common for in-network hospitals to employ physicians who are
not in that network.41  As a result, patients treated at an in-network hospi-
tal may receive balance bills from the out-of-network physicians who
treated them.42  This is confusing and unfair to patients.
C. Exorbitant, Obscenely High Charges
The problem of balance billing would not be of nearly as much con-
cern if the balance bills were not so outrageously high.43  That is, if hospi-
tals and other healthcare providers set their list prices at a fair and
reasonable level to begin with, the balance bills would not represent a crip-
pling financial burden for patients.44  Rather, they would simply represent
the difference between a reasonable list price and a likewise reasonable
reimbursement amount set by the insurance company.  In this economi-
cally sensible world (one that a properly functioning free market would
create), balance bills would often be zero or a minimal amount.  Unfortu-
nately, this does not represent the current reality of hospital billing, as
illustrated by the fact that in the case cited above, once the hospital re-
duced its charges, the bill went from $22,945 down to $600.45
What makes the problem of balance billing so pernicious is that the
bills not only surprise patients, but the total cost of the bills is often finan-
cially devastating.46  I have written before about outrageously high charge
[https://perma.cc/45J8-QNNU] (identifying hospital bargaining leverage as main
determinant of relative expensiveness within same hospital market).
38. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 18; Chen, supra note 5. See generally HOADLEY
ET AL., supra note 5.
39. See Chen supra note 5 (“It’s a pretty good bet that if you’re hospitalized or
having any kind of surgery, somebody along the way who touches you or your
slides or films will not be in network[.]” (quoting Karen Pollitz, Senior Fellow,
Menlo Park, California-based Kaiser Found.) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Nation, Determining Fair and Reasonable Value, supra note 7, at 427.
44. Id.
45. See supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text.
46. See e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the
Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 239, 247 (2010) (arguing
medical debt makes it difficult to get further healthcare); Melissa B. Jacoby & Eliza-
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master prices that hospitals insist are usual and customary, and I do not
wish to repeat that work here.47  It is sufficient to note that the amounts
reflected on balance bills, when based on chargemaster prices, are outra-
geously high, set to discounted and not paid, bear no relationship to the
hospital’s cost, and, if they are paid, yield truly enormous profits to the
hospital.48
D. Balance Billing Increases the Overall Cost of Healthcare
Because the profit maximizing conduct of hospitals, both for-profit
and not-for-profit, is unrestrained by competitive market forces, the over-
all cost of healthcare in the United States is inflated.49  The lethal combi-
nation of exorbitantly high chargemaster prices and the practice of
balance billing combine to put upward pressure on prices for healthcare
across the board.50  These practices not only directly increase the cost of
healthcare for the uninsured and out-of-network patients; they also indi-
rectly increase the cost of healthcare for everyone.51  While government
insurers who pay for more than half of the healthcare provided in the
United States no longer set reimbursement rates based directly on
chargemaster rates, higher chargemaster rates do indirectly put upward
pressure on government reimbursement amounts.52  However, more im-
portantly and the focus of this Article is the fact that the combination of
obscenely high chargemaster rates and the practice of balance billing in-
beth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative Account of Medical-Related
Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 548 (2006) (asserting about 46%–56% of
personal bankruptcies were caused by medical reasons); Christopher Tarver Rob-
ertson, Richard Egelhof & Michael Hoke, Get Sick, Get Out: The Medical Causes of
Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 66–68 (2008) (noting 23% of
home foreclosures were caused by “unmanageable medical bills”).
47. See generally Nation, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 12; Nation, Determin-
ing Fair and Reasonable Value, supra note 7; Nation, Obscene Contracts, supra note 3;
Nation, Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing, supra note 14.
48. See, e.g., Reinhardt, U.S. Hospital Services, supra note 4, at 63 (explaining
chargemaster prices “would yield truly enormous profits” if paid).
49. See Nation, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 12, at *26 (“[H]igh
chargemaster prices lead to [overall] higher prices for healthcare.”); Nation,
Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing, supra note 14, at 154 (“[T]he primary reason that the
non-profit model has dominated the hospital industry is that it provides camou-
flage and autonomy for the real profit seeking motives and/or elitist wealth trans-
fer motives of those in de facto control, and it affords a tax deduction that
enhances profits.”).
50. See supra note 10.
51. See supra note 10.
52. See Nation, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 12, at *26–30 (noting exorbi-
tant chargemaster prices cause higher overall prices for healthcare); Nation, Deter-
mining Fair and Reasonable Value, supra note 7, at 454 (discussing main reason
chargemaster prices are so high is that higher chargemaster prices lead to higher
revenues, though not dollar-for-dollar, for hospitals from government and private
insurers as well as from self-pay patients).
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crease the cost of healthcare for both uninsured and privately insured
patients.53
It is obvious why uninsured and out-of-network patients pay
more—because the dysfunctional market for healthcare allows hospitals to
set unreasonably high chargemaster rates and insist on balance billing out-
of-network, uninsured, and other self-pay patients.54  What is less obvious
is why this also increases the cost of healthcare for in-network patients.
Remember that patients are considered to be in-network if their insurance
company has entered into a contract with the hospital providing medical
services, and as a result, in network patients typically cannot be balance
billed.55
However, the negotiation of the contract that makes a patient “in-
network” is affected directly by exorbitant chargemaster rates and the
practice of balance billing.  For example, when a hospital or hospital sys-
tem and an insurance company negotiate reimbursement rates, the hospi-
tal system’s bargaining power is increased by the fact that if the insurance
company fails to agree to the reimbursement rates desired by the hospital
system, then all of the insurance company’s customers are balance billed
at chargemaster rates.56  This threat—agree to our reimbursement rates or your
insureds will face huge charges for healthcare—is strengthened each time the
hospital raises its chargemaster rates.57  This threat-based bargaining
power is irresistible in the case of a hospital or hospital system that is domi-
nant in its market.58  Insurers simply cannot sell health insurance policies
if those who buy them will be punished with exorbitant balance bills for
receiving care from the dominant provider in the market.59  As a result,
many insurers have no option but to agree to the high reimbursement
rates requested by the hospital system and to pass these costs along to their
customers/insureds in the form of higher prices for health insurance.60
53. See supra note 10.
54. See supra notes 24–48 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text.
56. See Bai & Anderson, supra note 10, at 923 (noting that high chargemaster
rates motivate insurers “to include hospitals in their networks to reduce the likeli-
hood of having subscribers pay high out-of-network prices”); Murray, supra note 10
(noting that high chargemaster rates “undermine the negotiating leverage of pri-
vate [insurers] relative to hospitals”).
57. See Murray, supra note 10 (discussing hospitals’ options when negotiating
with insurers).
58. See, e.g., Nation, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 12, at *21–22 (discussing
California Pacific Medical Center—owned by Sutter Health—and its amassed mar-
ket power allows it to charge “5 1/2 to over 10 times the Medicare reimbursement
rate”).
59. See id. at *28 (discussing how private insurers, even these with significant
market power, are forced to agree to high contractual reimbursement rates with
must have hospitals in their market).
60. See id. at *26 (discussing how “insanely high chargemaster prices lead to
over all higher prices” for insured patients as well as “self-pay patients”).
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The price of insurance (what insured patients pay for healthcare) conse-
quently goes up.61
An alternative for insurance companies is to simply sell narrow net-
work policies to uninformed customers and let these patients be shocked
and surprised by the balance bills they receive.  Narrow network policies
are of course cheaper, and the low price often attracts customers who do
not fully understand the risks posed by narrow network policies.62  As
noted, the majority of policies sold on ACA exchanges are narrow network
policies.63  In addition, several newspaper articles have focused on the
frustration, shock, and surprise of patients who receive huge balance
bills.64
Make no mistake, even non-profit, tax-exempt, so-called charitable
hospitals act exactly like their for-profit competitors when it comes to set-
ting obscenely high chargemaster prices and balance billing their pa-
tients.65  I have written before about the very uncharitable conduct of so-
called charitable hospitals, and there is no need to repeat that work here;
it is sufficient to note that there is no meaningful difference between the
conduct of non-profit and for-profit hospitals when it comes to conducting
their financial affairs, except of course that the non-profits make more
money because they do not pay taxes.66  Moreover, while the pricing and
collection limitations included in the ACA apply only to non-profit hospi-
tals, these provisions do not solve the balance-billing problem even in the
context of non-profit hospitals as discussed in the next Section.67  Thus,
there is little to be gained from simply applying the ACA’s ineffective price
and collection limitations to for-profit hospitals.
61. See id. at *28 (“[H]igher chargemaster rates do indirectly produce higher
hospital revenue from all private insurers.”).
62. See Armour, supra note 18 (discussing that customers who purchased cov-
erage through ACA are surprised by balance bills).
63. See id. (discussing how “plans sold on ACA exchanges have limited
networks”).
64. See supra note 5.
65. See Nation, Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing, supra note 14, at 174–79 (“The many
instances in which non-profit hospitals seem to place the pursuit of profit over
charity care has led the Commissioner of the IRS to observe that there is now very
little difference between for-profit hospitals and not-for-profit hospitals.”); cf. Bai &
Anderson, supra note 10, at 924 (finding that 98% of top 50 hospitals with highest
chargemaster rates were for-profit).  These findings are misleading with respect to
the difference between for- and non-profit hospitals.  The sample is small at fifty,
most of the top fifty were owned by just two for-profit systems, but most impor-
tantly the average chargemaster rate for all hospitals was 3.4 times Medicare allowa-
ble cost. Id. at 923.
66. See generally Nation, Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing, supra note 14, at 170–79 (dis-
cussing issues with non-profit hospitals).
67. See infra notes 68–83 and accompanying text.
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E. The ACA Actually Encourages Balance Billing
The ACA started out with laudable goals, however, much got lost in its
translation into legislation.  As noted above, the ACA contains limits on
what patients may be asked to pay out-of-pocket if they are covered by a
qualified health insurance policy, but these limits do not apply to non-
emergency charges of out-of-network providers.68  In other words, the out-
of-pocket limits established by the ACA do not apply to balance billing.69
The ACA also establishes limits on the amount that indigent, uninsured
patients may be charged for healthcare and the type of collection tech-
niques that may be used to recover healthcare debt.70  It is important to
note, however, that these limitations apply only to not-for-profit, tax-ex-
empt hospitals; they do not apply to for-profit hospitals.71  For-profit hos-
pitals make up approximately 20% of the hospitals in the United States,
and, while not directly relevant here, I have argued elsewhere that all hos-
pitals should be for-profit and taxable.72
In any event, an indigent patient eligible for a (not-for-profit, tax-ex-
empt) hospital’s financial assistance policy (FAP) may not be charged
more than the hospital’s generally billed amount (GBA).73  GBA is a rea-
sonable amount established under the ACA and may be based on either
the average amount the hospital bills private insurance and Medicare for
the services provided or the prospective Medicare reimbursement rate
alone.74  Moreover, these hospitals and their collection agencies are for-
bidden from using extraordinary collection techniques to collect hospital
debt from FAP-eligible patients.75
However, these provisions fail to solve the balance-billing problem
even for not-for-profit, tax-exempt hospitals for several reasons.  First,
these hospitals are free to define who is eligible for their financial assis-
68. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119, 855–858 (2010) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501
(r)(5)–(6) (2012)).  Emergency out-of-network charges are covered to some ex-
tent under the ACA. See ACA, §§ 1001, 10101(h), 42 U.S.C. 300gg-19a (2012)
(amending Public Health Service Act § 2719A); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2719A
(2016); 45 C.F.R. § 147.138(b) (2016).
69. See ACA § 1302(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)); Bai & Anderson,
supra note 10, at 923 (“The ACA requires nonprofit hospitals to provide discounts
to eligible uninsured patients.  However, the same provision lets individual non-
profit hospitals determine their own eligibility standards, does not address the
levels of the markup faced by out-of-network patients and casualty and workers’
compensation insurers, and does not apply to for-profit hospitals.”).
70. See supra note 67.
71. See supra note 67.
72. See generally Nation, Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing, supra note 14.
73. See I.R.C. § 501(r)(5)(A) (2012), amended by Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat.
2242 (2015).
74. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.150(r)–1 (2016) (defining amounts generally billed).
75. See I.R.C. § 501(r)(6).
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tance programs.76  Many hospitals define FAP eligibility according to in-
come levels based on the Federal Poverty Guidelines (FPG).  The problem
is that, in addition to the FPG limits, most of these hospitals also limit
eligibility for their FAPs to those who are uninsured.77  Obviously, this of-
fers no protection for patients subject to balance billing, who, by defini-
tion, are insured but have received care outside of their network.
Second, the recently finalized regulations implementing the ACA’s
limitations on hospital charges for FAP-eligible patients specifically allow
balance billing of patients who qualify for financial assistance.78  That is, if,
under a specific hospital’s FAP, an insured patient is eligible for financial
assistance and therefore the amount the hospital may charge is limited to
the hospital’s GBA, the hospital is specifically permitted to recover this
amount from both the insurance company and the patient.79  The hospital
may balance bill the FAP-eligible patient for an amount up to the
GBA amount even though the hospital has already collected the GBA
amount—an amount deemed to be the reasonable value of the services
provided according to the ACA, from the insurance company.80
Finally, the ACA specifically refers to a hospital’s “gross” charges,81
clearly indicating their chargemaster rates.  While the ACA does this with
good intentions, specifically requiring not-for-profit, tax-exempt hospitals
to charge less than their list prices to FAP-eligible patients (the ACA does
not say how much less) nevertheless references to chargemasters effec-
tively require that chargemasters—with their exorbitant prices—stay in ex-
istence.  In addition, hospitals continue to have the same incentives to
continually raise their chargemaster rates.82  As noted above, high
76. See id. § 501(r)(4)(A); Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals,
77 Fed. Reg. 38148, 38149 (June 26, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (“Neither
the [ACA] nor these proposed regulations establish specific eligibility criteria that
a [financial assistance policy] must contain.”).
77. See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic, Summary of Financial Assistance (PWO 13998),
available at https://my.clevelandclinic.org/ccf/media/Files/Patients/financial-as-
sistance-app.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/9BMS-JBPJ] (last updated Jan. 2013)
(“[W]e provide financial assistance . . . if you are a resident of the state in which
you are seeking care . . . do not have insurance, and your family income does not
exceed four times the FPG.” (emphasis added)).
78. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)–5(b)(2) (stating it is no violation of regulations if
the total amount paid by individual and health insurer exceeds AGB, so long as
individual’s portion—including co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles—does
not exceed the AGB).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. § 1.501(r)–1(b)(16) (“Gross Charges, or the chargemaster rate,
means a hospital facility’s full, established price for medical care that the hospital
facility consistently and uniformly charges patients before applying any contractual
allowances, discounts, or deductions.”).
82. Higher chargemaster rates mean greater revenue, though not dollar-for-
dollar. See supra note 49.
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss1/4
2016] THE BALANCE-BILLING PROBLEM 167
chargemaster rates contribute significantly to the severity of the balance-
billing problem.83
II. ANALYSIS: THE SOLUTION
It is important to recognize that our healthcare goals are not only to
control prices and to provide access to all Americans to basic healthcare,
but first and foremost, to develop the best healthcare in the world.84  The
best healthcare is that which can cure or treat the greatest number of dis-
eases and ailments with the greatest success.85  A thriving free market for
healthcare will accomplish our goals with regard to pricing and the devel-
opment of the best healthcare.86 The point is that the issue of how to
provide access to basic healthcare for low-income populations is separate
and distinct from the issue of how to develop the best healthcare.87  To
develop the best healthcare and to control costs, we must enhance the free
market for healthcare.88  Also, a robust free-market economy is the best
remedy for poverty and its effects, including lack of access to healthcare.
A. More Price Fixing Will Not Help
There is no question that when hospitals seek to collect their
chargemaster rates, they are acting unreasonably and, especially in the
case of charitable hospitals, unfairly.89  But hospitals are also responding
predictably—which is to say somewhat reasonably, though certainly not
charitably—to existing market forces.90  The solution is to change the
market conditions, such as the current lack of price transparency, that are
preventing the free market for healthcare from functioning properly.91
Price-fixing does not strengthen the free market; it destroys it and replaces
it with central planning.  Not only does prior experience suggest that this
will ultimately fail to control prices, it will also destroy quality.
83. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
84. See Nation, Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing, supra note 14, at 151–55 (discussing
how United States can better its healthcare system).
85. See id. at 151–52 & n.33 (discussing difference between “healthcare sys-
tem” versus “healthcare”).
86. See id. at 152 n.34 (discussing why free-market system is better for hospi-
tals).  I have written before about the dangers associated with incorporating the
access goal too tightly with the goal of developing the best healthcare, and I do not
want to repeat that work here. See generally id.
87. See id. at 207–09 (“[T]he issue of how to pay for medical care for the poor,
while it is not completely unrelated, is best treated as separate and distinct from
the issue of how to develop the best medical care at the lowest cost.” (footnote
omitted)).
88. See id. at 154–55 (discussing what changes should be made to healthcare
market).
89. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
90. See Nation Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 12, at *6–18 (discussing evolu-
tion of higher chargemaster rates).
91. See, e.g., Bai & Anderson, supra note 10, at 925 (discussing policy implica-
tions to market failure caused by lack of price transparency).
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The United States healthcare market already has too much price-fix-
ing.  Government insurers such as Medicaid and Medicare are price fix-
ers.92  Moreover, they represent a large share of the U.S. healthcare
market.93  Price-fixing, whether in the form of a single-payer system or in
the form of full-blown government healthcare, is not the solution because
it ignores the real goal: to develop a properly functioning free market for
healthcare, because this is the only way to develop the best healthcare.
B. Enhancing the Free Market for Healthcare
Enhancing the free market for healthcare will require the govern-
ment to work to prevent and reduce market concentration and ensure
relatively equal bargaining power of both providers and consumers (or
insurance companies as the consumers’ representatives).94  In addition, a
properly functioning free market requires price and quality transparency
so that consumers can actively choose the best value in healthcare95—that
is, the best healthcare at the cheapest price.  When consumers have this
information, providers are forced to compete in quality and price.  This is
the essence of a free market, and it is from this that all of its benefits flow.
Other than observing that certain provisions of the ACA are, unfortu-
nately, encouraging concentration in an already overly concentrated pro-
vider side of the market, I focus in this Part on how to increase price
transparency.96  It is also important to note that this Article seeks to
strengthen the free market for healthcare, and that necessarily includes
recognizing that providers should be free to set their prices at any level
they wish, with the exception of services provided in the emergency de-
partment.97  However, a properly functioning free market will force them
to set reasonable prices.
C. Increasing Price Transparency Using the Common Law of Contracts
One of the most significant problems in the market for healthcare is
the lack of price transparency.98  Patients do not know at the time of con-
tracting how much they are agreeing to pay for the services that will be
92. See, e.g., Reinhardt, U.S. Hospital Services, supra note 3, at 60 (discussing
price setting by Medicare).
93. See Nation, Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing, supra note 14, at 186 n.237 (noting
that “the [g]overnment is now responsible for paying for more than fifty percent
of U.S. healthcare via various programs, principally Medicare and Medicaid”).
94. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (discussing how hospitals
hold more financial bargaining power).
95. See, e.g., Bai & Anderson, supra note 10, at 924–25 (discussing lack of
transparency in market failure).
96. See infra notes 99–123 and accompanying text (discussing how to increase
price transparency).
97. See supra note 67.  For a discussion of contract prices, see infra notes
124–33.
98. See, e.g., Nation, Determining Fair and Reasonable Value, supra note 7, at
426–29 (discussing lack of price transparency in healthcare contracts).
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provided to them.99  As a result, it is virtually impossible for patients to
compare hospitals based on price.100  This, in turn, means that hospitals
are not forced to compete on price.  As mentioned above, it is also impor-
tant for hospitals to compete on quality, but in the current market envi-
ronment, it is much easier for patients to get an idea of the relative quality
of hospitals than it is for them to get an idea of how much they will be
responsible for paying for the services that they receive.101  My focus here
is on increasing price transparency.
Not only is price transparency critical for the proper functioning of
the free market, but basic principles of contract law also require that the
parties clearly establish the terms of their agreement or, if the court is
convinced the parties intended a contract but did not clearly establish
some terms, including the price, the court will imply a reasonable price to
the contract consistent with the parties’ presumed intent.102  At the heart
of the common law requirements for the creation of a contract is its recog-
nition of the freedom of individuals to knowingly and freely enter into
enforceable agreements.103  The problem with healthcare contracts en-
tered into directly with patients is that they are not knowingly and freely
entered into with respect to price.104
As discussed in more detail in the next Section, courts can now use
the common law principles of contracts to rein in the abusive balance-
billing practices of hospitals.105  In this Section, I renew a suggestion I
have made previously for regulation that will enhance the functioning of
the free market by increasing price transparency.106  In addition, I recom-
mend here specific patient disclosures designed to ensure healthcare con-
tracts entered into directly with patients are knowingly and freely entered
into with respect to price.107  My recommendation regarding price disclo-
99. See id. (discussing how patients are not aware of full costs of healthcare).
100. See id. at 429 (“[A]s long as hospitals use a´ la carte pricing based on
chargemasters, consumers will not be able to effectively negotiate price.”).
101. There are many ranking services available regarding the relative quality
of healthcare. See, e.g., U.S. News Best Hospitals 2015–16, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
http://health.usnews.com/best-hospitals/rankings [https://perma.cc/6L2M-2Y
WV] (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
102. See infra notes 166–70 and accompanying text (discussing creation of
contracts between parties).
103. See infra notes 151–70 and accompanying text (discussing common law
of contracts).
104. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 225–32 and accompanying text (discussing how common
law contract principles can be used in healthcare).
106. See Nation, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 12, at *36–44 (discussing
proposed solution for cost of healthcare).
107. See infra notes 108–23 and accompanying text (proposing recommenda-
tion for price disclosures by hospitals).
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sure are similar to Regulation Z108 (Regulation Z is issued by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to implement the federal Truth
in Lending Act, which is contained in Title I of the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act109), which applies to consumer lending and ensures that con-
sumers know and understand the credit terms of the loan they are
agreeing to.110  Similarly, in the context of healthcare contracts, the gov-
ernment’s role should be to require disclosure of the relevant pricing
information.
Requiring the following would be helpful to provide patients with the
relevant information they need regarding price to enter into an enforcea-
ble contract with a hospital regulation: (1) all providers should be re-
quired to adopt the same pricing system, but not the same prices111 and
(2) a number of disclosures including the following need to be made to
the patient prior to the creation of the contract.112  First, the patient
should be told the total amount that the hospital will charge (including
amounts charged to the patient’s insurance or any other third-party payer)
for the care to be provided.  Second, the patient should be told the maxi-
mum amount, in dollars and cents, that the patient will be expected to pay
for the services for which they are contracting.113  Third, the hospital must
disclose the amount, in dollars and cents, that the hospital receives from
Medicare for the same services and the average amount the hospital re-
ceives from private insurers for the same services.114  Fourth, hospitals
must tell the patient explicitly that the hospital accepts these amounts,
from private and government insurers, as full payment for these services.
Fifth, the hospital must disclose explicitly, again in dollars and cents, how
much more the hospital is asking the individual patient to pay for these
108. Regulation Z is issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System to implement the federal Truth in Lending Act, Title I of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1616 (2012).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1601.
110. See id.; see also Keith T. Peters, What Have We Here? The Need for Transparent
Pricing and Quality Information in Health Care: Creation of an SEC for Health Care, 10 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 363, 364 (2007) (noting that with proper information
healthcare consumers can make rational decisions).
111. This is a recommendation that others and I have made before. See Bai &
Anderson, supra note 10, at 927 (regarding legislation requiring all reimburse-
ments to be based on the same system such as diagnostic-related groups); Nation,
Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 12, at *38.
112. See Bai & Anderson, supra note 10, at 925–26 (proposing required price
disclosures by hospitals).
113. I have previously argued that a reasonable price for medical services is
no more than 115% of the Medical reimbursement rate. See Nation, Determining
Fair and Reasonable Value, supra note 7, at 460–65.
114. See Nation, Obscene Contracts, supra note 3, at 118–19 (discussing how hos-
pitals usually do not collect full amount of charges from government and private
insurers).
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exact same services.115  Sixth, the hospital should also inform the patient
that it negotiates rates with private insurers and, if the hospital in fact does
so, with self-pay patients on a case-by-case basis.  Finally, a prominent space
should be provided on the disclosure form for the total negotiated price
the patient and the hospital have agreed to and the amount of discount
received by the patient.116
These regulations should be written, similar to Regulation Z, so that a
single, consistent, and easy to read and understand form is used by all
hospitals to convey this pricing information to the patient.  Not only will
this type of regulation ensure that patients are knowingly and freely enter-
ing into contracts with hospitals, but it would also facilitate the compari-
son of prices between hospitals by patients.  This in turn will result in price
control via market forces.
If these disclosures regarding price are not made prior to contracting
for any reason, then the court must decide if the parties intended to con-
tract, which would clearly be the case if the patient received any treatment
from the hospital, and if a contract was created, the court must provide a
reasonable price term for the parties.117  For example, a hospital may con-
tinue to use its price-ambiguous “Authorization for Treatment,” “State-
ment of Financial Responsibility,” or some other similar open-ended
agreement pursuant to which the patient purports to agree to pay for all
medical goods and services provided by the hospital at the hospital’s
chargemaster prices.118  But if these open-price agreements were used, the
patient would not be liable to the hospital for any more than a reasonable
amount as decided by the court.119  That is, whenever the provider does
not make the required disclosures, the court will apply a reasonable price
to the contract based on the average price paid for the same services by
private insurers plus a modest percentage between 1% and 15%.120
As discussed more fully in the next Section, even in the absence of
legislation requiring these price disclosures, courts should not interpret
typical admission forms signed by patients—such as an “Authorization for
Treatment,” “Statement of Financial Responsibility,” or some other similar
open-ended agreement, which purport to establish a formula based on the
hospital’s chargemaster to arrive at the price the patient has agreed to pay
for the services the hospital may provide—as establishing a definite
price.121  Rather, these types of forms have been compared “to a blank
115. See id. at 119 (“However, while all patients and payors are billed the ‘full
charges,’ the only ones actually expected to pay these charges are those patients
without medical insurance.”).
116. This is similar to the disclosure box required by Regulation Z. See supra
notes 108–09.
117. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2012).
118. See infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 111.
120. See supra note 111.
121. See Nation, Determining Fair and Reasonable Value, supra note 7, at 426–27.
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check given by the patient to the hospital with the amount to be unilater-
ally filled in by the hospital at a later date.”122  This is not at all consistent
with common law contract principles that require parties to knowingly and
freely enter into contracts.123  As a result, the court should not find that
these writings are binding with respect to establishing the price for the
goods and services provided by the hospital to the patient.124  Simply put,
under the common law of contracts, the hospitals that fail to fully disclose
relevant pricing information, as discussed above, may recover no more
than the fair market value of the goods and services provided.125
D. Price Setting Freedom in a Free Market
One of the hallmarks of a free market is freedom of contract.126  That
is, individual market participants are free to enter into contracts on any
terms that they knowingly and freely agree to within the parameters estab-
lished by the common law.127  These parameters include requirements
such as capacity and legality, and compliance with normal contract polic-
ing tools such as fraud, duress, undue influence, and unconscionability.128
Thus, in a free market, businesses are typically free to establish their prices
at any levels they see fit, and potential customers are of course free to
reject prices that they consider to be too high.  In order to come to an
agreement, the parties negotiate the  terms—including the price—of the
contract.
Because the purpose of the recommendations made here are to
strengthen the operation of the free market, this Article takes the position
that providers of medical goods and services must be free to set their
prices as they see fit.  Direct government price controls are not only incon-
sistent with the idea of freedom of contract that underlies the free market;
they also disrupt the functioning of the free market and prevent it from
achieving its ultimate goal of efficient resource allocation.129  Moreover, a
properly functioning free market will control prices.130  In addition, as
discussed in the next Section, I argue that the common law of contracts
122. Id. at 427.
123. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 225–32 and accompanying text (discussing application of
contract principles to healthcare).
125. See infra notes 228–34 and accompanying text (discussing how prices
should be set in contracts whether its by parties or courts).
126. See infra notes 151–70 and accompanying text (discussing freedom of
contract).
127. See infra notes 151–70 and accompanying text (same).
128. See infra notes 234–41 and accompanying text.
129. If prices are set too high, the excess profits attract more sellers and in
turn the increased supply cause prices to come down.  As a result, the proper level
of resource allocation is achieved and maintained.
130. See supra note 128.
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includes sufficient flexibility to allow judges to apply its principles to en-
sure that hospitals cannot engage in unfair pricing practices.131
The common law of contracts also leaves hospitals and other provid-
ers sufficient pricing flexibility to charge extremely high rates to patients
who are able and willing to pay them.  Commentators as well as hospital
administrators often recount the “Arab Sheik” scenario.132  This scenario
involves an Arab Sheik, invariably extremely wealthy, arriving at the hospi-
tal seeking medical services; the Sheik is supposedly able and willing to pay
any price that the hospital demands.133  Hospital administrators, clearly
misunderstanding the common law of contracts, fear that without their
exorbitant chargemasters, they would not be able to charge the Sheik an
exorbitant, overpriced amount for the hospital’s services.134  Why it is ac-
ceptable to overcharge a wealthy Arab Sheik, especially in the case of a so-
called charitable hospital (which is an implicit assumption in this scena-
rio) is unclear to me.  Freedom of contract and the rules established by
the common law of contracts allow hospitals to charge any patient any
amount the hospital wishes as long as the patient and the hospital freely
and knowingly agree.135  The frequency with which one encounters the
Arab Sheik scenario would seem to suggest that it is quite common, how-
ever, even without the advantage of empirical evidence, I am tempted to
conclude that it may represent more wishful thinking than reality.  In any
event, to maintain such a ridiculous and pernicious chargemaster pricing
system in the vein hope for the arrival of an Arab Sheik certainly seems to
be an example of the tail wagging the dog.
E. The “Just Say No” Approach
Some companies that self-insure for health insurance and their third-
party administrators have created health insurance plans that dispense
with networks altogether.136  Under these direct-pay plans, contracts are
not entered into with any providers.137  Employees insured under these
plans are free to go to any provider they like.138  When the bill is
presented, the company pays an amount determined to be reasonable
131. See infra notes 151–241 and accompanying text (discussing how courts
can apply common law contract principles to healthcare).
132. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 37.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See infra notes 151–72 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Jay Hancock, Radical Approach to Huge Hospital Bills: Set Your Own
Price, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 13, 2015), http://khn.org/news/radical-ap
proach-to-huge-hospital-bills-set-your-own-price/ [https://perma.cc/8EGM-DJV7]
(“When hospitals send invoices with [jaw-dropping] charges . . . [ELAP Services]
tells its clients (generally medium-sized employers) to just say no.”).
137. See id. (“Under ELAP’s main [approach], neither employers nor their
claims administrators sign contracts with hospitals.”).
138. See id. (discussing how individuals can use any provider they choose be-
cause there is no network).
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based on reference to the amounts paid by other payers.139  For example,
the company may reimburse the hospital at the Medicare reimbursement
rate plus a percentage, such as 25% or 30%.  Hospitals are not required to
accept this amount as full payment, because they have not entered into a
contract with the company/insurer.  Moreover, the hospital may balance
bill the patient/employee for the difference between the hospital’s
chargemaster amount and the amount paid by the company/employer.140
However, the companies that offer such plans and their third-party
administrators typically fight such balance-billing efforts on behalf of the
employee/patient.141  The few companies offering such plans report great
success so far.142  One such third-party administrator is ELAP Services, a
small benefits consulting firm, based in Chester Springs, Pennsylvania.143
According to an ELAP spokesperson, when ELAP clients are sued by hos-
pitals in pursuit of balance bills, the company “fights back with lawyers and
several arguments. How can hospitals justifiably charge employers and
their workers so much more than they accept from Medicare . . . ?  How
can hospitals bill $30 for a gauze pad?  How can employee-patients con-
sent to prices they will never see until after they’ve been discharged?”144
ELAP reports that “[e]ventually, ‘overwhelmingly, the providers just ac-
cept the payment’ and leave patients alone.”145  Whether this approach
will be upheld in court in hospitals’ balance-billing claims against patients
is unknown.
ELAP was named as a defendant in a federal district court case
in Georgia, which was decided in 2012 in ELAP’s and the employer’s
favor—but the issue in that case was limited to whether the administration
of the direct payment plan was consistent with the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).146  The court held that it was, but as the
provider was acting in the place of the insured pursuant to an assignment
of the insured’s rights to benefits under the plan the case did not involve
balance billing.147  That is, no state law claims, the balance-billing claim
would be a contract claim, were part of the proceeding.148
139. See id. (“[ELAP] estimate[s] costs . . . based on the hospital’s financial
reports filed with Medicare.  Then it add[s] a cushion so the hospital [can] make a
modest profit.”).
140. See id. (discussing how ELAP fights back when clients are balance billed).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See id. (quoting Steve Kelly, Chief Exec. Officer, ELAP).
146. See, Floyd Med. Ctr. v. Warehouse Home Furnishings Distribs. Inc., No.
4:11–CV–15(CDL), 2012 WL 1438470, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2012) (addressing
whether charges were “reasonable” and “customary” and whether they were
covered).
147. See id. at *5–6.
148. See id. (stating that plaintiff did not “assert[ ] any type of state law claim
that was independent of the federal ERISA claim”).
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III. WHAT COURTS CAN AND SHOULD DO NOW
Courts can use the common law of contracts to rein in abusive bal-
ance-billing practices.  As this Part discusses, the common law of contracts
is based on the premise that courts will enforce agreements that are en-
tered into knowingly and freely by individuals.149  Contracts entered into
between healthcare providers and patients are not knowingly and freely
entered into with respect to price, and therefore the courts should not
149. See, e.g., Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L.
REV. 317 (2002).
The consideration can be as nominal as a peppercorn for the agreement
to be legally enforceable.  Courts do not inquire into the distribution of
benefits between the parties.  This legal fact is deeply rooted in a strong
faith in the efficiency of free markets.  Individuals do not voluntarily
enter into agreements that they expect to make them worse off than
before the agreement.  If the agreement was made voluntarily, everyone
is presumed to have been made better off by the agreement.  This pre-
sumption can be justified by economic thought which, given a few simple
axioms, demonstrates that markets will channel resources to their most
valued use and maximize society’s wealth when all market participants are
permitted to freely make their own decisions.  Government intervention
cannot improve the allocation of resources and can even impede it.
Id. at 343–44 (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1.3–1.4, at 4–10 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing
freedom of contract and philosophical foundation of contract law respectively).
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, for example, involved a real estate broker who found
a buyer for the seller. See 236 A.2d 843, 846 (N.J. 1967).  The seller and buyer
entered into a contract for sale, but the contract was never performed due to
breach by the buyer.  The broker brought suit against the seller, alleging that,
based on the express terms of the listing agreement, the commission was earned
upon execution of the contract between buyer and seller.  The court ruled that any
contractual provision in the listing agreement that required the seller to pay the
commission even though the buyer of the land was unable to arrange financing
and therefore breached the contract of sale, was “so contrary to the common un-
derstanding of men, and also so contrary to common fairness, as to require a court
to condemn it as unconscionable.” Id. at 857.  In so ruling, the court applied the
following reasoning, which is equally applicable to hospital admission contracts:
Courts and legislatures have grown increasingly sensitive to imposi-
tion, conscious or otherwise, on members of the public by persons with
whom they deal, who through experience, specialization, licensure, eco-
nomic strength or position, or membership in associations created for
their mutual benefit and education, have acquired such expertise or mo-
nopolistic or practical control in the business transaction involved as to
give them an undue advantage.  Grossly unfair contractual obligations re-
sulting from the use of such expertise or control by the one possessing it,
which result in assumption by the other contracting party of a burden
which is at odds with the common understanding of the ordinary and
untrained member of the public, are considered unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable.
. . . .
The perimeter of public policy is an ever increasing one.  Although
courts continue to recognize that persons should not be unnecessarily
restricted in their freedom to contract, there is an increasing willingness
to invalidate unconscionable contractual provisions which clearly tend to
injure the public in some way.
Id. at 856, 857 (citation omitted).
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enforce the ridiculous prices alleged to be due pursuant to these
contracts.150
A. Common Law of Contracts
1. Law of Voluntary Agreements: Freedom of Contract
A contract may be defined as a promise the courts will enforce.151
The concept of freedom of contract, which plays a central role in the law
of contracts, reflects the idea that individuals should be free to enter into
contracts on any terms they wish.152  There are, of course, limits to the
150. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Phoenix Bap-
tist Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., v. Aiken, 877 P.2d 1345 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (denying
summary judgment where husband signed admission agreement for wife that pur-
ported to make husband as signer personally liable for services provided to his
wife, noting that husband may not have understood agreement or felt he had no
choice but to sign); Tunkl v. Regents Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963)
(rejecting contract with exculpatory clause, noting that patients are in “no position
to reject the proffered agreement, to bargain with the hospital, or in lieu of agree-
ment to find another hospital”); Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775,
783–86 (Ct. App. 1976) (rejecting agreement to arbitrate, noting that hospital ad-
mission agreement “possess[es] all of the characteristics of a contract of adhe-
sion”—contracts offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no realistic opportunity
to bargain and such that the goods or services cannot be acquired without agree-
ing to the terms offered—and that “admission to a hospital is an anxious, stressful,
and frequently a traumatic experience” as result patient cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to read the printed agreement in detail much less to fully comprehend its
terms); St. John’s Episcopal Hosp. v. McAdoo, 405 N.Y.S. 2d 935, 937 (Civ. Ct.
1978) (holding that in emergency admission hospital should not be permitted to
enforce contractual obligation entered into under such tension-laden
circumstances).
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (“A contract is a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”).
152. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 149, § 1.3, at 5.
The crux is that as England changed from a relatively primitive backwater
to a commercial center with a capitalistic ethic, the law changed with it.
As freedom became a rallying cry for political reforms, freedom of con-
tract was the ideological principle for development of the law of contract.
In Maine’s classic phrase, it was widely believed that “the movement of
the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract.”  Williston adds: “Economic writers adopted the same line of
thought.  Adam Smith, Ricardo, Bentham and John Stuart Mill succes-
sively insisted on freedom of bargaining as the fundamental and indis-
pensable requisite of progress; and imposed their theories on the
educated thought of their times with a thoroughness not common in eco-
nomic speculation.”
In the twentieth century the tide turned away from the nineteenth
century tendency toward unrestricted freedom of contract.  Today, while
the parties’ power to contract as they please for lawful purposes remains a
basic principle of our legal system, it is hemmed in by increasing legisla-
tive restrictions. . . .
Apart from legislative restrictions on freedom of contract, it seems
likely that in the future there will be greater restrictions imposed by
courts in the exercise of their function of developing the common law.
There has been increasing recognition in legal literature that the bar-
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freedom of contract doctrine, which reflect other policy concerns of our
legal system.153  For example, one cannot enter into an enforceable con-
tract to sell illegal drugs.154  However, within the broad parameters estab-
lished by the legal system, freedom of contract is a fundamental principle
of contract law.  Moreover, the principle of freedom of contract is consis-
tent with the idea of a free-market economy, and one of the most impor-
tant functions served by contract law is to facilitate the operation of the
free market.155  That is, buyers and sellers may use contract law to create
agreements on whatever terms they see fit.156  In addition, the principle of
freedom of contract counsels that the role of the courts is to enforce the
agreement created by the parties.157  Courts are not to create contracts for
the parties, nor are courts required to approve the agreement the parties
created, except to ensure that it falls within the broad parameters of con-
tract law principles.158  The parties must create their own contracts be-
cause it is only through the aggregate interactions (contracts) of market
participants that the market can determine the appropriate allocation of
resources.159
However, the doctrine of freedom of contract does not mean that the
courts do not play a role in the contract formation process; on the con-
trary courts play a very important role by both establishing and enforcing
the rules that must be followed to create a contract.160  For example,
courts apply these rules to ensure that only agreements knowingly and
freely entered into by the parties are enforced.161  Courts require that
gaining process has become more limited in modern society.  In purchas-
ing a new automobile, for example, the individual may be able to dicker
over price, model, color and certain other factors, but, in order to con-
summate the contract to purchase, the individual usually must sign the
standard form prepared by the manufacturer (although the contract is
with an independent dealer).  The individual has no real choice and
must take that form or leave it.  Such contracts, called contracts of “adhe-
sion,” constitute a serious challenge to much of contract theory.
Most of contract law is premised upon a model consisting of two alert
individuals, mindful of their self-interest, hammering out an agreement
by a process of hard bargaining.  The process of entering into a contract
of adhesion, however “. . . is not one of haggle or cooperative process but
rather of a fly and flypaper.”  Courts, legislators and scholars have be-
come increasingly aware of this divergence between the theory and prac-
tice of contract formation, and new techniques are evolving for coping
with the challenges stemming from this divergence.
Id. § 1.3, at 5–6 (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., supra note 150.
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contracts be knowingly and freely entered into because, to agree, both
parties must know what they are agreeing to and voluntarily agree.162
It is not possible to agree to nothing; similarly it is not possible to
agree to allow the other party to charge any amount he wishes.163  Such
terms are not contracts or even agreements—they are the opposite of an
agreement; they are simply an exercise of power by the stronger party
against the weaker party.164  The doctrine of freedom of contract allows
parties to agree to whatever terms they wish, but it does require that the
parties agree.165  Freedom of contract does not allow for the enforcement
of the law of the jungle in the guise of a contract.  If one party purports to
agree to allow the other party to charge any amount he wishes as the price
of the contract, such an agreement is not likely a contract, because it was
not likely knowingly and freely entered into.166  Who would knowingly
and freely agree to such a term?  No one.  Yet, as discussed infra, this is
precisely what hospitals claim.
Traditionally courts have required the parties to specifically agree to
all necessary terms in order to create a contract.167  However, modern
courts are more willing to supply missing terms for the parties if the court
is convinced that the parties in fact intended to enter into a contract even
if the words or writings of the parties do not clearly establish all necessary
terms.168  When the court fills in this term, it provides a term that is consis-
tent with the reasonable expectations of the parties.169  For example, if
162. See supra note 150.
163. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 (1981) (defining illusory
promise as one that furnishes no basis for a contract because of lack of considera-
tion); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 149, §§ 2.1, 2.13, at 25, 73 (discussing mu-
tual assent and indefiniteness respectively).
164. See, e.g., supra note 152.
165. See supra notes 150 & 164.
166. See supra note 150.
167. See supra note 163.
168. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 149, § 2–13, at 45–46 (2d ed. 1977).
There is an important distinction between cases in which the parties
have purported to agree on a contractual provision and have done so in a
vague and indefinite manner and cases in which they have remained si-
lent as to a material term or have discussed the term but did not purport
to agree upon it.  When parties are silent as to a material term, often the
reasonable conclusion is that they intended that the term be supplied by
implication.  Thus, if A and B agree that A will perform a service for B and
no mention is made of price, it will be implied that the parties intended
that a reasonable price should be paid and received.  The same is true if
goods are involved.  It will be assumed that the parties contracted in
terms of a reasonable price which will ordinarily be the market price.
Where there is no market price the reasonable price may be determined
by actual cost plus a reasonable profit or other means of valuation.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 204 (1981) (discussing how to supply omitted essential terms).
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (“When the parties to a
bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term
which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is
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the court is called upon to fill in the price term of the contract, it will seek
to determine a fair and reasonable price, because this is what reasonable
contracting parties would intend.170
2. Objective Intent and the Essential Requirements of Contract
While a contract is a promise the courts will enforce and while all
contracts are promises, not all promises are contracts.  The common law
of contracts uses the concept of objective intent and from it has derived
the essential requirements of contract in order to determine which
promises are contracts and which are not.171  Objective intent is very dif-
ferent than subjective intent.172  Objective intent makes no attempt to
pick the brain of the person whose intent is in question.173  Rather, to
determine objective intent, we do not focus at all on the person whose
intent we are trying to determine; we instead focus on a hypothetical rea-
sonable person in the position of the other party—the party interacting
with the person whose intent we are trying to determine.174  The law uses
the hypothetical reasonable person to determine the objective intent of
the other person based on the other person’s objective manifestations.175
Objective manifestations are the things done and said—in this context by
the person who’s intent we are trying to determine—that may be per-
ceived by others.176  Thus, for contract law purposes, a person’s intent is
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.”); CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 149, § 2.9.
170. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (citing U.C.C.
§ 2-305).
171. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO supra note 149, § 2–2, at 24–25 (2d ed.
1977) (discussing objective and subjective intention).
A party’s intention will be held to be what a reasonable man in the posi-
tion of the other party would conclude his manifestations to mean.  By
testing the meaning to be given to a party’s words from the point of view
of the reasonable man in the second party’s position, the subjective ele-
ment of this party’s particular knowledge is incorporated into the objec-
tive test.  In other words, the test considers what the second party knows
or should know about the intention of the first party.
The objective theory is strongly supported by those who place the
basis of contract law upon the promisee’s justified reliance upon a prom-
ise or upon the needs of society and trade.  An objective test is believed to
protect “the fundamental principle of the security of business transac-
tions.”  Even those who espouse intention as the basis of contract obliga-
tions are generally willing to hold a promisor to the reasonable meaning
of his words, basing such liability on a theory of negligence, but are in-
clined to wish that the objective theory be held on a short leash, and to
allow subjective intention a high degree of relevance in the resolution of
many contractual issues.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
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deemed to be that which is consistent with the perceptions of a hypotheti-
cal reasonable person in the other party’s position.177
Using an objective standard to determine intent for contracts pro-
vides certainty, which is especially important given the role that contract
law plays in facilitating business transactions.  Under the doctrine of free-
dom of contract, whether the parties have entered into a legally enforcea-
ble agreement, a contract is and should be based on the intent of the
parties involved.  However, the intent we are concerned with is their objec-
tive intent.  As a result, the essential requirements of contract reflect what
we would expect hypothetical reasonable people to do if they intended to
enter into an enforceable exchange of promises.  Specifically, the essential
requirements of contract are (1) offer and acceptance, (2) consideration,
(3) legal abject, and (4) capacity.  In particular, the specific requirements
for the offer and acceptance reflect the objective intent idea.178
3. Offer and Acceptance: Knowingly and Freely Agreeing
In order for an offer to be made, three requirements must be satis-
fied.  The first is intent to contract.179  That is, the person making the
offer, the offeror, must indicate a willingness to exchange one thing for
another.180  The second requirement is that the terms of the offer must be
reasonably definite and certain.181  Not only does this requirement indi-
cate that the parties have fully developed their agreement, it also, as a
practical matter, is necessary for the court to determine if a breach has
occurred and, if so, the appropriate remedy.182  The third requirement is
that the offer must be communicated to the person who is trying to accept
it.183
For example, if one party, a new car dealer, says to another, “I would
like to sell this car,” and the other party, after test driving the car and fully
examining it, says, “I would like to buy it,” no contract has yet been
formed, because the parties have not specified the terms of the contract
with reasonable certainty.  That is, we do not know the price the seller is
willing to accept or the price the buyer is willing to pay.  Moreover, with-
out this information, it seems unlikely that the parties have actually en-
tered into a contract; rather, they seem to still be in the process of
177. See id.
178. See e.g., id. § 2.1, at 26 (5th ed. 2003) (noting that essential prerequisite
to formation of informal contract is agreement—mutual manifestation of assent to
same terms).
179. See id.
180. See id. § 2.5, at 31 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2)
(specifying that parties must make commitment to do or refrain from doing some
specified thing in future).
181. See id. § 2.13, at 75 (noting performances to be rendered by both parties
must be reasonably certain).
182. See id.
183. See id. § 2.15, at 78 (adding that generally offeree must know of offer to
accept).
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negotiation.184  However, a problem arises where the parties act as though
they have a contract, even though their words or writings have not spelled
out all of the terms.185
In the above example, this situation would be illustrated if the seller
had delivered the car to the buyer, and the buyer accepted it notwithstand-
ing the fact that they had not agreed on a specific price.186  Given the
actions of the parties, it is clear that they both thought that they had a
contract; why else would the car have been delivered and accepted?187
However, if the parties cannot agree on a specific price, for example, the
seller sends a bill to the buyer, which is higher than the buyer is willing to
pay, then a court may be called upon to determine the price.188  In doing
so, the court will seek to determine a reasonable price, one to which rea-
sonable contracting parties would agree.189  While reasonable people may
differ somewhat concerning what constitutes a fair price, the MSRP or
manufacturer’s suggested retail price of the car is clearly not a reasonable
price because it is set to be discounted and not paid.190  The same is true
of list prices in healthcare except that in healthcare the list price is set
much higher as a percentage of reasonable value than in the case of an
automobile.191
4. Types of Contracts
There are various types of contracts, including express, implied-in-
fact, and implied-in-law.192  All real contracts (as discussed below, implied-
in-law contracts are not real contracts) must satisfy the same essential re-
quirements discussed above.  The difference between an express contract
and an implied-in-fact contract is the way in which the parties create the
contract.193
An express contract is created by the use of words, either written or
oral.194  For example, a typical type of express contract is an Agreement of
Sale for real estate.  This contract is formed by words, the words written in
the Agreement of Sale and agreed to by the parties as evidenced by their
signature at the end of the agreement.  An implied-in-law contract is created
184. See supra notes 170–83 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 149, § 2.18, at 82 (5th ed. 2003).
186. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2013) (describing “[c]onduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of a contract”).
187. See id. § 2-207(1)–(2).
188. See supra notes 170–83 and accompanying text.
189. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 149, § 2.9, at 55 (5th ed. 2003) (dis-
cussing that courts fill gaps with terms that “comport[ ] with community standards
or fairness and policy”).
190. See id.
191. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
192. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 149, § 1.11, at 21 (4th ed. 1990) (dis-
cussing express, implied, and quasi contracts).
193. See generally id.
194. See id.
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by the actions of the parties.  For example, assume that Joe often visits
Jane’s Candy Store on his lunch break and usually buys a candy bar for
one dollar.  One day during his lunch break, Joe visits Jane’s candy store
and selects a candy-bar but observes that Jane is busy with a customer and
has several other customers waiting.  Joe catches Jane’s attention shows
her the candy bar and walks out of the store.195  Based on these facts, Jane
and Joe have entered into a contract pursuant to which Joe is legally obli-
gated to pay for the candy bar.196  The contract is based on the actions of
the parties.197  Specifically, Jane has made an offer by setting up her store,
inviting the public to shop there, and placing the candy out for sale.  Joe
has accepted by taking the candy bar, acknowledging it to Jane and leaving
the store.  The requirement of consideration is satisfied because the candy
is being exchanged for the money.  There is nothing illegal about buying
and selling candy, and as long as both parties have capacity to contract, all
of the essential requirements for a contract have been satisfied and en-
forceable contract has been formed.  In this case, the price, like the other
terms of the contract, is established by the conduct of the parties.198  Spe-
cifically, their prior dealings establish one dollar as the price.199
Of course, in a free market, Jane is free to change her prices at any
time.  However, in order for a changed price to become part of the con-
tract, the other party must agree to it.200  For example, if Jane had decided
to raise her prices the night before Joe came into the store, would Joe be
bound to pay the new price?  The answer depends on whether the parties
intended (objectively) the new price to apply.201  In this case, if Jane had
clearly marked the new price on the candy, then the new price would be-
come part of the contract.202  In other words, if the new price were clearly
marked, a reasonable person in Joe’s position would only have taken the
candy bar if he were willing to pay the posted price.203  On the other
hand, if Jane had failed to take actions necessary to bring the new price to
the attention of a reasonable person in the buyer’s position, then the new
price would not apply to the contract.204
An implied-in-law contract, also called a quasi-contract, is not a real
contract and therefore does not depend upon these essential require-
ments for its enforceability.205  The requirements for a quasi-contract are
that a benefit has been given by one party to the other, the party receiving
195. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 illus. 2 (1981).
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See supra notes 151–83 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 171.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 149, § 1.11, at 21.
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the benefit has kept it—that is, refused to return it—and the court finds
that allowing the party to keep the benefit without payment is unfair.206
When a court decides that a quasi-contract exists, it will require the
benefitted party to pay the amount necessary to remedy the unfairness.  A
quasi-contract is not a real contract because it is not based on the agree-
ment of the parties; rather it is based on the equitable policy of furthering
justice by preventing an unjust enrichment.207  Moreover, since there is
no agreement between the parties, the court has to provide the appropri-
ate amount to be paid.208  In most real contract cases, the court enforces
the amount that the parties have agreed upon.
A fair question at this point is what does all of this have to do with con-
tracting for healthcare?  The principles just discussed apply to contracting in
general and thus apply to contracting for healthcare.  Moreover, some
commentators get confused regarding the distinction between implied-in-
law contracts and implied-in-fact contracts, especially in the healthcare
context.209  This may be due in part to a very common law school example
involving healthcare services.
The law school example involves a doctor, licensed and in good pro-
fessional standing under the applicable state law, happening upon an in-
jured motorist on the side of the highway who has been in an accident.210
The injured person is unconscious and in need of medical attention.211
The doctor provides medical attention and then sends a bill to the pa-
tient.212  May the doctor recover for the services he provided?213  There is
certainly no real contract between the doctor and the patient, since there
was never any agreement between them due to the fact that the patient
was unconscious.  However, under the doctrine of implied-in-law contract,
the doctor may recover the fair value of his services from the patient.214  It
is reasonable to assume that most patients in this situation would want the
206. See id. at 22 (describing quasi-contract as “the body of law to which we
look for the reallocation of gains and losses between the parties”).
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 21.
211. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, Mark A. Hall & Kevin A. Schulman, Overbil-
ling and Informed Financial Consent—A Contractual Solution, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED.
396 (2012) (recounting this example and mislabeling it as implied-in-fact
contract).
212. See id. (“A staple law-school hypothetical illustrates the usual function of
implied contracts: a physician encounters an unconscious stranger in the street
who requires immediate medical attention.  The physician promptly gives the
stranger the requisite emergency care and later submits a bill for her services.  Is
she entitled to payment?”).
213. Id.
214. Id.; see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 149, § 1.11, at 21 (providing
similar example).
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doctor’s services, and therefore the patient will receive an unjust enrich-
ment unless required to pay the doctor.215
When it comes to the question of how much the doctor should be
paid, obviously this cannot be based on the agreement of the parties, so
the court must fill in the amount.216  In setting the price, the court uses
the fair market value of the services because it is reasonable.217  While this
scenario may be relevant to an emergency department situation, it is not
directly relevant to the balance-billing context.  As discussed in the next
Section, in typical balance-billing contracts, there is no question that the
parties have entered into an agreement for medical services, pursuant to
which the patient expects to pay for the medical services received.218  The
problem in the balance-billing context is that the parties have not specifi-
cally agreed to a price; hospitals typically require patients to sign some
agreement pursuant to which the patient purports to agree to pay for the
services received at the hospital’s chargemaster, usual, or customary
prices.219  The problem, as discussed above, is that chargemaster prices
are not usual or customary; they are exorbitant, grossly unfair, and are set
to be discounted rather than paid.220  In other words, in the balance-bill-
ing context, it is as though the parties have entered into a contract for
medical services but have not specified a price.221
5. Good Faith
The common law recognizes an obligation of good faith in every con-
tract.222  Good faith is generally defined as honesty in-fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.223  As a result,
all parties to a contract must act in good faith in the performance and
enforcement of every term of a contract.  The obligation to act in good
faith strengthens this Article’s conclusion.  That is, to pay the hospital
based on its chargemaster or similar rates in cases where a patient has
agreed by signing a “Statement of Financial Responsibility” or some other
open-ended financial agreement at the time of admission to the hospital,
the common law requires that this provision be performed and enforced
in good faith.  Good faith, as noted, requires observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.  As a result, it would be inconsistent
215. See id.
216. See, e.g., Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 832 A.
2d 501, 508–11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (rejecting hospital’s billed charges as proper
measure of reasonable value under theory of unjust enrichment and instead used
market value based on amount most patients actually paid for services).
217. See id.
218. See infra notes 227–29 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 178–90 and accompanying text.
222. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (imposing duty
of good faith on parties to contract).
223. See id.
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with the common law of contracts to allow the hospital to recover based
on its chargemaster rates.  Rather, the observance of reasonable commer-
cial standards of fair dealing would require that the hospital be permitted
to recover no more than a reasonable price for its services.224
B. Contracting for Healthcare
1. Promise to Pay Regular, List, Customary, or Chargemaster Rates
In the balance-billing context, however, hospitals argue that the par-
ties have established a formula to arrive at the ultimate price that the pa-
tient will pay for the services provided based on the hospital’s
chargemaster, and therefore the court must use this formula to determine
the amount the patient owes.225  But have the hospital and the patient
really agreed on a price?  The answer is clearly no, as the supposed
chargemaster based formula is illusory; all aspects of it remain completely
within the control of the hospital.226  The problem of inexact price infor-
mation at the time of contracting is not unique to the sale of healthcare,
but healthcare is the only area in which the parties purport to use a blank
check as payment.227  For example, many professionals such as lawyers
base their charges on an hourly rate, and it is often not possible to know at
the time of engagement how many hours a matter will take.  However,
unlike the healthcare situation, the hourly rate is agreed to at the time of
engagement and cannot be changed unilaterally by the lawyer.  In con-
trast, hospitals often do not provide any price information, a copy of their
chargemaster, or any other specific information to the patient at the time
of contracting, and worse—hospitals retain the right to change their
chargemaster rates at any time.228
This situation with the hospital more closely resembles that of an auto
mechanic and a customer, when the customer takes his car to the
mechanic because it is having some unspecified problem and the
mechanic refuses to give an exact price to repair the car because the
mechanic does not yet know how much repair will be necessary.  If the car
owner and the mechanic agree that the mechanic will work on the car and
then determine the price, an express contract has been entered into, even
though no specific price was agreed upon.  However, the law does not
grant the mechanic the right to charge whatever price they will; rather, the
224. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
225. See e.g., Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306, 310–11
(Ind. 2012) (stating chargemaster rates should be used to set contract prices).
226. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 37 (quoting Professor Glenn Melnick)
(noting that hospitals may set chargemaster rates at any level they want and set
them to “maximize revenue”); see also Nation, Chargemaster Insanity, supra note 12,
at *1–18 (same).
227. See Nation, Determining Fair and Reasonable Value, supra note 7, at 426–32
(describing patient as giving hospital ability to unilaterally determine prices later).
228. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 786 (noting that hospitals may change
their chargemaster rates at any time).
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obligation of good faith discussed in Part IV(A)(5) requires that the
mechanic exercise discretion to set the price in good faith;229 that is, the
mechanic must set a commercially reasonable price.230  The mechanic
cannot charge any more than the fair market value for the work the
mechanic has performed.  If the mechanic and customer cannot agree as
to what a reasonable price is, then the court will set the price.231
Similarly, in the case of contracting for healthcare, the court must
step in and provide the price for the parties since it is clear—based on
both the conduct and words of the patient and the hospital—that they
intend to have a contract.  The court should reject the hospital’s claim
that it should be free to calculate the price, based on its elusive and ever-
changing chargemaster rates, and should, consistent with the common law
principles of contract, imply a term into the contract that requires the
patient to pay a reasonable price for the services received.232
2. Patients Required to Pay Prior to Treatment
Where the hospital requires an upfront payment of all, or a certain
percentage of the overall amount that the patient will be liable for, the
parties have effectively established a specific price for the services that will
be provided by the hospital.  In this case, usually there is still a good argu-
ment that under contract law principles, the patient should be liable for
no more than the reasonable value of the services received.  This argu-
ment focuses on the common law requirement that contracts be know-
ingly and freely entered into.233  Chargemaster prices are simply
unreasonable; no reasonable person would knowingly and freely agree to
pay such exorbitant rates.234  That is, if the hospital had informed the
patient that they were being asked to pay at least 2.5 times the amount that
in-network patients pay and that the hospital gladly accepts this lower
amount as full payment for the same exact services, no reasonable patient
who had a choice would agree to pay the exorbitant chargemaster rates.235
As a result, a good argument also remains that an agreement to pay
chargemaster prices is unconscionable.236  That is, the patient either did
not make an informed choice to pay these prices or the patient had no
229. See supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 169–74 and accompanying text (discussing implied con-
tracts that rely on reasonable terms).
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (explaining courts infer
terms such as price that are reasonable under circumstances).
232. See infra notes 240–62 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 150–92 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
235. See Bai & Anderson, supra note 10, at 923 (noting that in 2012 on average
U.S. hospital charges were 3.4 times Medicare-allowable cost); see also supra notes
43–48 and accompanying text.
236. See Nation, Obscene Contracts, supra note 3 (arguing that contracts with
hospitals pursuant to which patients purportedly agreed to pay chargemaster rates
are unconscionable).
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choice but to agree.  If the patient did not have the ability to acquire the
services elsewhere, the contract is procedurally unconscionable, and be-
cause the chargemaster rates are grossly unfair, the contract is also sub-
stantively unconscionable.237  Thus, the contract should not be
enforced.238  Other common law theories might also be applicable in this
context, including fraud in the inducement or undue influence.  Ulti-
mately, what gives all of these arguments strength is the truth of the basic
facts underlying the transaction.  Specifically, chargemaster prices are ex-
orbitant and unfair and no sane person properly informed would agree to
pay them.
3. Determining the Reasonable Price of Healthcare
I have written previously and in detail about how courts should deter-
mine the reasonable price for healthcare.239  It is sufficient here to note
that I strongly support using, when possible, a price set by the free market
as a basis from which to establish the reasonable price.  When this is not
possible, it may be necessary to alternatively use the Medicare price as a
basis.
4. Rejecting Usual, Customary, and Necessary
How do we determine the fair and reasonable price for healthcare?
Hospitals would prefer to frame the question in its traditional manner:
what is the usual and customary charge for the necessary medical services
provided?  Hospitals, of course, answer this question with reference to
their chargemasters.  They support this argument with a deceptive state-
ment that “all patients are billed chargemaster rates,” and therefore those
rates are their usual and customary rates.240  However, while all patients
may be billed chargemaster rates, all patients are not expected to and do
not in fact pay chargemaster rates.241
Moreover, the hospital knows, accepts, and plans on treating the ma-
jority of its patient’s pain on less—much less—than chargemaster rates.242
Chargemaster rates are a fiction, they are not set to be paid; they are set to
be discounted.243  Statements by hospital administrators to the contrary
are disingenuous.  Once the relevance of chargemaster rates are rejected,
then the question can be phrased properly: what is the value established
by the market of the services provided by the hospital?  In other words,
what is the fair market value of the services the hospital has provided?
Thus, the focus is on what is actually paid and accepted for the services,
237. See id. at 128–32 (discussing cases in which courts did not enforce exces-
sive hospital bills).
238. See id. at 132–34.
239. See generally Nation, Determining Fair and Reasonable Value, supra note 7.
240. See id. at 430.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
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and not on some phantom chargemaster-based billed charges that very few
ever pay and that no one should be expected to pay.244
5. Prices Based on Fair Market Value
The fair and reasonable value of medical expenses must be based on
the usual amount actually paid to the provider, not by the amount billed
by the provider.245  A hospital invoice of itemized billed charges at
chargemaster rates is, when it comes to measuring fair value, a complete
fiction and should not be used by courts or others to establish the fair and
reasonable value of medical services.246  Hospitals engage in price discrim-
ination.  They charge different amounts to different patients for the same
exact services, depending upon the identity of the party paying the bill.247
Government insurers pay the least, private insurers pay more, and self-pay
patients, including individuals with private insurance that receive balance-
bills, pay the most.248  As a result of the perceived unfairness of this price
discrimination, some commentators have called for an all-payer system.249
Under an all-payer system, various methods may be used to arrive at a
particular price for a good or service.250  For example, the government
may set prices or each hospital may set its own price.  However, regardless
of how prices are set, once they are set, the price must be posted for public
view and must apply to all patients without discrimination.251  Although I
recognize that it is unfair to allow hospitals to charge any patient
chargemaster rates, I have argued against all-payer systems, because a part
of what appears to be price discrimination is really market-driven discount-
ing designed to purchase value from specific buyers.252  Because of this,
imposing an all-payer system would be disruptive to the market and create
inefficiency.253
Hospitals charge lower rates to insurers because insurers provide cer-
tain benefits to hospitals.254  These benefits include an increased volume
of business through access to patients who are insured by the insurance
company, assurance of quick and full payment of discounted charges from
the insurance company, as well as marketing and advertising benefits that
result from being listed as “in-network” by the insurance company.255
244. See id.
245. See id. at 457–65 (arguing that amount should be “determined by the
lowest amount the hospital/provider accepts as full payment from government or
private insurers”).
246. See id. at 446–57 (detailing hospital pricing and relationship to insurers).
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
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These benefits are valuable to hospitals and result in a portion, but only a
portion, of the discount from chargemaster rates that private insurers re-
ceive.  It is likely that the most important of these benefits to hospitals is
the increased volume of business that results from entering into a contract
with a large insurer.256  After all, any patient who pays with a credit card
provides an assurance of payment similar to that provided by the insur-
ance company.  Hospitals reason that because individuals do not bring the
extra benefits such as an increased volume of business, which insurance
companies bring to hospitals, individuals should pay more than the
amount paid by insurers.257
The best way for courts and others to determine the fair and reasona-
ble value of medical services is to start with the average amount the hospi-
tal would be paid by private insurers and then add to this an amount
between 10% and 15% to account for the value of the benefits private
insurers provide to hospitals.258  It is important to note that the system I
recommend, while it may be described as a form of price-fixing, is differ-
ent than a government-controlled, all-payer system.  The formula I suggest
to determine a fair and reasonable price is based on a price freely set by
the market.259  No individual market participant, provider or insurer, may
control the base.260  Encouraging a freer and more transparent market for
the sale of healthcare is the only approach that will result in appropriate
pricing while simultaneously encouraging the development of the best
healthcare in the world.  More price-fixing will only make the problem
worse.261
IV. CONCLUSION
The chargemaster rates set by hospitals are exorbitant because they
are set to be discounted and not paid.  As a result, it is grossly unfair to
enforce these rates against any patient; this is why balance billing is such a
pernicious problem.  There are many reasons for the development of ex-
orbitant chargemaster rates, but the most important reason they continue
to cause problems is a lack of price transparency in contracting for health-
care.  Regulation, as suggested in this Article, to provide price trans-
parency and make sure that patients knowingly and freely agree to the
price term in contracts for healthcare would help to eliminate the
chargemaster/balance-billing problem.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 460–65 (suggesting method to determine “fair and reasonable
value of medical services”); see also Anderson, supra note 3 (developing another
method).
259. See Nation, Determining Fair and Reasonable Value, supra note 7 (explaining
how method takes supply and demand principles into account).
260. See id.
261. See id.
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However, courts can and should begin now to rein in the balance-
billing problem.  As this Article explains, the common law of contracts
provides the necessary tools for courts to use to enforce fair and reasona-
ble prices in contracts for healthcare.  When an individual contracts with a
hospital for healthcare, courts should use these common law tools to en-
sure that the patient is not liable to pay any more than a fair and reasona-
ble price for the services received.  Moreover, a fair and reasonable price
should be based on the average amount the hospital receives from private
insurers for the services provided to the patient.
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